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One need not look far for such liturgical kitschifications: in many worship 
services the angels no longer cry out ‘Holy, Holy, Holy – but rather Nice, 
Nice, Nice!’… A kitschified cross no longer drips blood but honey, no 
longer embodies pain but plastic, no longer mediates salvation but 
sentiment.1 
 
 
Introduction 
To describe an object or image as ‘kitsch’ is to take aim with the weapon of 
aesthetic and ethical judgment, the most popular ammunition being the 
accusation of ‘bad taste’. This assault is often launched at humble 
imaginings that attempt to depict sacred subjects through objects or images 
that constitute the meaning of religion in the everyday. The failure of these 
objects in the eyes of kitsch critics is due to their being ‘bad art’ or ‘bad 
religion’, or worse still, having both these properties fused into the single 
object. From the anti-kitsch point of view, the one thing more abominable 
than a portrait of children on the grass is a portrait of children on the grass 
clustered at the feet of Jesus.2 Of course, this image is not necessarily kitsch 
in itself, nor is it inherently worthy of derision, especially since the two are 
                                                
Elisha McIntyre is a casual teacher and research assistant in the Department of Studies in 
Religion at the University of Sydney. 
1 Johan Cilliers, ‘The Unveiling of Life: Liturgy and the Lure of Kitsch’, HTS Theological 
Studies, vol. 66, no. 2 (2010), p. 3. 
2 The sight of children on the grass is particularly repugnant to Milan Kundera, and I am 
here alluding to his often quoted definition of kitsch that holds sweet children, or rather 
images of them, to be exemplary of the kitsch aesthetic. He writes, “Kitsch causes two tears 
to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: how nice to see children running on the 
grass! The second tear says: how nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children 
running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.” See Milan Kundera, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 251.  
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not always synonymous. Indeed, for many individuals this image would be 
moving and inspiring. This is the problem with kitsch: it is a culturally 
loaded term that problematises, through its historical connotations of cheap 
and inauthentic tastelessness, any relationship with a ‘kitsch’ object that is 
in fact genuine, meaningful and positive. The result is that lovers of kitsch, 
those who Hermann Broch calls ‘kitsch-men’, are brought ethically into 
aesthetic arguments so that it is not just the objects’ deficiency but those 
who appreciate (or simply fail to notice) the object’s deficiency that 
become the point of scorn.3  
This article seeks to discover whether the term ‘kitsch’ is 
salvageable from beneath this heavy burden of classically negative and 
elitist judgments that dismiss it as unsophisticated and facile or even 
immoral and evil.4 In order to answer such a quest it must be discerned 
whether or not there are any characteristics of kitsch that exist 
independently of subjective and personal taste, in other words elements not 
automatically read in terms of what Roger Scruton calls the “yuk feeling.”5 
It will be argued that there are indeed characteristics that identify a 
religious object as kitsch, including ambiguous distinction between sacred 
and profane, commodification, imitation, the deliberate and easy 
manipulation of emotions and the agency of the believer in the construction 
of meaning for the object. This necessarily involves some discussion of the 
aesthetics and ethics of religious imagery in general, but this aestheticism 
leads us nowhere if it is not supported by an application to concrete 
practices. The point here is to look at these aspects without self-
satisfactorily dismissing them as ‘bad’. This is a very difficult task, and to 
prevent such an occurrence religious kitsch must be considered in terms of 
those who embrace it as part of their religious practice in addition to the 
perspective of its critics. Thus in the second section of the article the 
definition will then be tested against concrete examples. For purposes of 
testing universal, or at least, cross-cultural, claims these examples will 
compare kitsch from Christian and Muslim traditions, the former the 
                                                
3 Hermann Broch, ‘Notes on the Problems of Kitsch’, in Kitsch: A World of Bad Taste, Gillo 
Dorfles (ed.), (New York: Universe Books, 1969), p. 49.  
4 Broch deemed the maker of kitsch to be a “malefactor who profoundly desires evil”. See 
Hermann Broch, ‘Evil in the Value System of Art’, in Dorfles, Kitsch, p. 76.  
5 Roger Scruton, ‘Kitsch and the Modern Predicament’, City Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 (1999), at 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/9_1_urbanities_kitsch_and_the.html. Accessed 15/2/2015. 
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subject of substantial Western aesthetic scholarship and the latter lacking in 
similar attention. While this means the application of schemas developed 
for Christian experience to non-Christian experience is thus somewhat 
unavoidable, it is hoped that ultimately there are generalities that prove 
“kitsch” to be useful as a label that helps identify a discrete category of 
religious material objects across religious traditions. 
 
Kitsch and Religious Kitsch 
Kitsch as both term and concept comes out of the nineteenth-century boom 
in consumerism which led to a proliferation of cheap goods produced with 
the intent of being passed off as more accessible versions of higher priced 
(and quality) goods.6 This would explain why kitsch has typically been 
associated with cheapness and mass-production. Yet kitsch objects do not 
have to be cheap in terms of monetary value, and while there is indeed a 
tendency for kitsch to be produced and sold at a minimum quality and cost, 
this is not a sufficient factor in making something kitsch; there are 
examples of kitsch that are expensive and well crafted, and objects that 
draw attention to their costliness can become kitsch by virtue of their self-
consciousness. Thus kitsch is more than a matter of economics. This is 
because, as many scholars of material culture have been aware, physical 
objects reflect non-physical ideas, even causing or determining belief 
systems and social behaviour.7 So the mass production of inferior quality or 
cheaper goods produced kitsch when the motive behind it was to enable the 
working and middle classes to imitate the wealth and status of the upper 
classes. Thorstein Veblen argued that when the lower classes try to imitate 
the manners and taste of the upper classes, they could never do so properly 
and so their attempts became superficial and artificial.8 What Veblen means 
by ‘properly’ is left to the reader’s own judgment. Presumably, writing in 
                                                
6 According to Tomas Kulka there are those who argue for earlier dates for the emergence of 
the concept of kitsch even though the term was not used prior to the late nineteenth century. 
However, he argues that from the nineteenth century onwards the spread of kitsch was 
increasing and I agree with his assertion that “whether kitsch began at some point in recent 
history, or whether it is as old as art itself, one thing is beyond dispute: Kitsch has become 
an integral part of our modern culture, and it is flourishing now more than ever before”. See 
Tomas Kulka, Kitsch and Art (University Park, Pennsylvania: State Press, 1996), p.16.  
7  Colleen McDannell, ‘Interpreting Things: Material Culture Studies and American 
Religion’, Religion, vol. 21, no. 4 (1991), p. 373. 
8 Quoted in Jukka Gronow, The Sociology of Taste (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 35.  
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1899, Veblen’s class consciousness was finely attuned to what has in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries come to be regarded as ‘elitism’, where 
the supposed upper classes are naturally bestowed with superior or ‘proper’ 
taste.  
This elitism became particularly pronounced in the art world, and 
as attacks on the grounds of kitsch were rife amid industrial design circles 
of the nineteenth century, in the twentieth, it was the art world that came to 
equate kitsch with ‘bad art’ and ‘bad taste’. Influential critics such as 
Clement Greenberg set the agenda for artists and critics to fear and loathe 
‘bad art’.9 What is meant by ‘bad’ is again open to interpretation, and for 
the most part in terms of kitsch it is taken to mean sentimental, inauthentic, 
fake (“spurious” for Greenberg), shallow, undemanding yet superficially 
provocative, mediocre and immoral.10 These and many more adjectives 
have been used to describe art of the kitsch variety, most of them in a 
similarly pejorative vein. Yet the popularity of kitsch is, for its critics, a 
most frustrating feature, and leads to ethical judgments not only of objects 
but of individuals, for the popularity of kitsch is not reconcilable with its 
status as ‘bad art’ unless the masses are similarly assumed to exhibit ‘bad 
taste’.11  
This is where the terms of kitsch become particularly murky, for it 
is in these kinds of judgments that the categories of aesthetics and ethics 
become confused.12 This is a problem especially for religion, since religion 
already has a history of problematic relations between aesthetics and 
ethics.13 This naturally translates into an ambiguous relationship with the 
arts, as well as, and even more significantly for our purposes here, the 
objects and images that make up what has been called ‘lived religion’.14 
The dilemma of religious kitsch is that on the one hand it is considered an 
inappropriate vehicle for representations of the sacred, in varying degrees 
the image of the divine is believed to be beyond and above representation 
in the kitsch style. On the other hand, religious kitsch is in many instances 
                                                
9 Roger Scruton, Modern Culture (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 92.  
10 Clement Greenberg, Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p.10.  
11  Ruth Holliday and Tracey Potts, Kitsch! Cultural Politics and Taste (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 240.  
12 Broch, ‘Notes on the Problem of Kitsch’, p. 71. 
13 Frank Burch Brown, Religious Aesthetics (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 3.  
14 David D. Hall, ‘Introduction’, in Lived Religion in America: Towards a History of 
Practice, ed. David D. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. vii-xiii.  
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regarded as a legitimate and meaningful channel for communion with the 
divine.  
From the negative stance kitsch is ‘bad religion’. Karl Pawek has 
included in his definition of kitsch not only “stylistic deficiency” but also 
“theological deficiency”.15 Kitsch is thus offensive on two levels, and 
despite Pawek’s attempt to separate the categories of aesthetics (stylistic 
deficiency) and ethics (theological deficiency), it is extremely difficult to 
extract the ‘bad religion’ argument from that of ‘bad taste’ or ‘bad art’. 
This is because, if we are working solely with reference to the religious 
traditions that accede that the sacred can in fact be represented visually, the 
logic that suggests a statue of the sacred heart is theologically deficient is 
dependent on the assumption that it is deficient because it is inadequately 
or inauthentically representing Christ, rather than an objection to the 
representation in itself. This is solely because the form is inferior and 
unworthy and thus the whole object is in ‘bad taste’. This line of reasoning 
presumes no objection to ‘high art’ images of Christ, for instance in 
Renaissance masterpieces, because they are the opposite of stylistic, and 
thus in Pawek’s sense, theological, deficiency.  
Pawek fails to describe what it is about religious kitsch that makes 
it not worthy to stand up to the responsibility of depicting holy subjects. S. 
Brent Plate states that, “because of the power of the sacred, there are rules 
that must be followed in the correct manner in order for the profane to 
come in contact with it. There is a dividing line between the two, but there 
are always ritualistic passages that allow those lines to be crossed”.16 He 
cites washing hands and lighting candles as examples of such ritualistic 
passages. We can extend his argument further to encompass the visual 
boundaries that separate the sacred and profane to suggest that religious 
kitsch is inadequate for the visual representation of the sacred because it 
has failed to undergo certain ritualistic processes in the correct manner (or 
at all). These would include matters not only of production but also context 
and intention. Non-kitsch religious imagery traditionally is housed in 
‘serious’ religious contexts, such as a church or a mosque, thus the space in 
which the picture of Christ hangs or the calligraphic name of Allah is 
exhibited has been consecrated and set aside as holy. The images 
                                                
15 Karl Pawek, ‘Christian Kitsch’, in Dorfles, Kitsch, p. 145.  
16 S. Brent Plate, Blasphemy: Art That Offends (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2006), p. 
40. 
Religious Kitsch in Theory and Practice 
Literature & Aesthetics 24 (2) December 2014 88 
themselves may also be blessed, as in the objects used in the Catholic 
liturgy. These objects, by virtue of their production, location and 
sanctification become unique and exclusive. In contrast, religious kitsch is 
available widely and profusely, from religious bookshops to secular 
discount stores, and one can come across it without necessarily crossing the 
boundary between sacred and profane. From the anti-kitsch perspective 
religious kitsch has not gone through the process of separation from other 
profane items, and so has not been made worthy to receive the image and 
by extension the presence of the sacred. Thus a Quranic wall clock is more 
home decor than sacred image.  
These rules are not, however, in practice made exclusively by 
religious institutions. While in theory it is the religious tradition that 
dictates such processes, for example ritual laws drawn from scriptural 
authority, in reality, the use of religious kitsch demonstrates that those 
believers who use these objects religiously are able to ritually process them 
on their own terms in order to make them worthy. It is their actions with an 
object that determine its religious worth, as David Morgan states “the 
practices of belief are even more common measures than what people say 
they believe”.17 When believers make the conscious decision to purchase an 
item of religious kitsch for the purpose of spiritual devotion, this act forms 
the process by which contact is permitted between the sacred and the 
profane. The way in which the object is used determines its spirituality for 
most lovers of religious kitsch, and its popularity reflects a concern with 
spiritual purpose rather than official sanction, especially as that official 
reading of kitsch depends on a hierarchy of taste that betrays an elitism that 
proves difficult to justify when faced with the reality of the dissolution of 
distinctions between high and low culture, sacred and profane. 18  For 
example the Last Supper necktie (Figure 1) brings high culture 
(Renaissance art) into low culture (fashion) and the sacred (Christ’s last 
moments) together with the profane (a necktie). 
 
 
                                                
17 David Morgan, ‘Art, Material Culture and Lived Religion’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Religion and the Arts, ed. Frank Burch Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p. 486.  
18 Sam Binkley, ‘Kitsch as a Repetitive System: A Problem for the Theory of Taste 
Hierarchy’, Journal of Material Culture, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000), p. 132. 
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Figure 1: Last Supper Necktie, Krisar Enterprises. Image retrieved 15/2/2015 from 
http://www.marketworks.com/storefrontprofiles/DeluxeSFItemDetail.aspx?sfid=481
98&c=799569&i=217928676. 
 
The creation of such an object reveals religious kitsch as motivated by 
more than what Veblen called “conspicuous consumption”.19 The Last 
Supper necktie may be a ‘conversation piece’ but it paradoxically reveals 
and conceals a broader process of commodification of religion in which 
religious symbols, experiences, rituals, even beliefs may be in one way or 
another commercially exchanged or marketed.20 This manifests especially 
in religious kitsch, which is the most obvious form of religion that can be 
bought and sold, its value specifically influenced by its religious 
associations (often exclusively and superficially of a visual kind) yet 
simultaneously subject to the same seductive and ubiquitous forces of 
consumerism that impact on all commodities. Kitsch cannot be as 
motivated by show as Veblen’s theory suggests because part of the power 
                                                
19 See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Toronto: Dover Publications, 
2012[1899]), pp. 43-62. 
20  ‘Online Store’, Krisar Enterprises, at 
http://www.marketworks.com/storefrontprofiles/DeluxeSFItemDetail.aspx?sfid=48198&c=7
99569&i=217928676. Accessed15/2/2015. This page is a useful example of the blurring of 
categories as it explains that the tie can be worn to parties or to work as a conversation 
piece, as well as its physical properties (100% ‘silk-feel’ polyester), followed by a detailed 
description of the image including a more narrative than theological explanation of the 
actions of all twelve apostles; for example “Peter is holding a knife, which is pointed away 
from Christ, also a foreshadowing of Peter’s violent protection of Christ in Gethsemane”; 
and lastly we are told to check out the sellers other items and given our PayPal options for 
Christ’s last moments. The issue of commodification of religion is far beyond the focus of 
this article, so I direct the reader to works such as R. Laurence Moore, Selling God: 
American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994); David Lyon, Jesus In Disneyland (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); and Luiz 
Alexandre Solano Rossi, Jesus Goes to McDonald’s: Theology and Consumer Society 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011). 
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of kitsch lies in its implication of the user in a mutual deception where 
religious kitsch makes use of the shorthand created by commodity fetishism 
in mistakenly attributing the value of the object to its appearance.21 In this 
way objects can be designated as religious kitsch if they appear as such, 
that is, hiding the processes of their manufacture so that a figurine of 
Vishnu purchased in a discount store is religious kitsch, perhaps even a 
sacred object if a believer can recognise the presence of the deity in it22. 
This is despite the likelihood of its creation in a factory, its packaging in 
foam or plastic and its discounted purchase price; as well as its deficient 
visual qualities such as messy paint job, garish colour scheme or misshapen 
sculptural form. Kitsch’s hallucinatory power aids in transcendence of such 
inadequacies. In addition, religion’s power to transcend the banalities of the 
everyday imbues the objects with the extra authority of the sacred, making 
the object doubly powerful because the twin gods of consumerism and 
divinity have decreed them to be so.23 
Importantly, such a spiritual and fetishistic aura re-mythifies the 
object that has been de-mythified by the processes of mass reproduction.24 
This is an attempt to regain, or rather imitate, the originality and uniqueness 
of the initial image. The uniqueness of the image has been lost in its 
conversion to an easily replicated formula, where the worth of the object is 
simplified into its ability to recreate for the kitsch viewer the emotions 
evoked by the original. Returning to the Last Supper necktie, it can be seen 
that the object has no great value independent of its imitation of the great 
painting. 25  Without such a reference, regardless of how cheaply or 
inaccurately imitated, the object becomes just another polyester tie; and so 
by destroying the uniqueness of Da Vinci’s image paradoxically the tie 
creates an illusion of uniqueness. Interestingly, the most immediate 
objection to such parasitic behaviour refers to the violation of a great 
                                                
21 Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer 
Culture (New York Continuum, 2005), p. 37.  
22 Allison Chan, ‘Religious Kitsch: Faith in Drag’, Encounter [radio program], ABC Radio 
National (28/02/2014) at http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/encounter/5282962. 
Accessed 1/03/2015.  
23Colleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 18.  
24 Gillo Dorfles, ‘Kitsch’, in Dorfles, Kitsch, p. 26.  
25 Ulrich Timme Kragh, ‘Of Pop, Kitsch, and Cultural Heritage’, The Newsletter, no. 62 
(2012), p. 9. 
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masterpiece. Here is the secret to religious kitsch’s innocence, something 
that is used in the image’s defense by lovers of religious kitsch: the tie is 
not trying to imitate God, and bypasses blasphemy in its self-consciousness 
since it is actually imitating other attempts to represent the divine and this 
second degree results in a replica of emotion rather than holiness. In this 
way Matei Calinescu is correct in the assertion that the falsehood of kitsch 
should not be confused with forgery. He writes “the deceptive character of 
kitsch does not lie in whatever it may have in common with actual forgery 
but in its claim to supply consumers with essentially the same kinds and 
qualities of beauty as those embodied in unique or rare and inaccessible 
originals”.26  
It does this visually as well as emotionally, and kitsch has as its 
basic aesthetic strategy the repetition of images that are familiar and easily 
recognisable. It operates as abbreviation for a long tradition of visual 
representation, by utilising the shorthand that comes in the form of a 
recognisable visual language, the work having already been done by 
centuries or millennia of continual use of the same images. This is in part 
why kitsch is sometimes considered easy or lazy. However, the visual 
traditions also are perpetuated by this process, which reinforces 
conservative imaginings of religion, for example the pervasiveness of the 
depiction of Christ as Caucasian, blue eyed, with flowing locks, facial hair 
and robes and above all gentle and tender. A notable is example is Warner 
Sallman’s 1941 painting Head of Christ which David Morgan has shown to 
be both tapping into historical depictions of this Jesus and influential on the 
popular religious imagination in turn.27  
It is the preference for emotional rather than intellectual 
relationships with these objects that many have found so odious. Robert C. 
Solomon argues that it is our poor opinion of the emotions, especially the 
softer, ‘sweeter’ emotions that are at the heart of the distaste directed at 
kitsch. 28  Kitsch is also charged with not only invoking excessive or 
unwarranted emotions, but doing so deliberately and self-consciously, and 
                                                
26 Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, 
Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 252.  
27 David Morgan, ‘Imagining Protestant Piety: The Icons of Warner Sallman’, Religion and 
American Culture, vol. 3, no. 1 (1993), pp. 29-47. 
28 Robert C. Solomon, ‘On Kitsch and Sentimentality’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, vol. 49, no. 1 (1991), p. 1.  
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even to the point of self-indulgence. Like consumer desire, which Vincent 
J. Miller states “is not really about attachment to things, but about the joys 
of desiring itself” the joy of kitsch is similarly in the emotion elicited rather 
than any genuine attachment to the actual object.29  Miller warns that 
because this seeking after unquenchable emotion and desire is akin to 
seeking an infinite God they may be confused and conflated into generic, 
unspecific desire. 30  Religious kitsch sits at the crossroads of these 
categories quite comfortably and smugly, meeting the desire for God, the 
desire for emotion and the desire for desire indiscriminately and in one 
convenient step.  
Critics of religious kitsch fail to recognise that these objects may 
inspire religious experience, and if they do the experience is assumed to be 
somehow false or inferior. Kitsch is accused of seeking emotion where 
there is no object that would warrant that emotion. So for example, 
religious kitsch elicits religious devotion without an encounter with God.31 
This presumes a very narrow view of the functions of kitsch, one in which 
the sacred is understood as somehow being present in the object or the 
object allows for the believer to transcend their ordinary selves to encounter 
God. This is certainly the case for many items of religious material culture, 
for example in Hindu statues in which the deity is considered present or in 
ceremonies of Mende women in Sierra Leone in which the wearer of a 
spiritual mask embodies the spirit.32 However, these kinds of religious 
material culture are found in explicitly religious contexts, such as in a 
temple, on a pilgrimage, or in a sacred ceremony. The aims of religious 
kitsch are of a less dramatic, more domestic, even humble nature. As David 
Morgan writes about popular Christian imagery, their popularity “is based 
on the way they answer to the needs of the devout, replying in a voice that 
is not grandiose, imposing, authoritative, or impersonal, but tailored to the 
stature of the believer’s life”.33 For example the artifacts that make up 
Catholic domestic shrines do not only cement relationships with the divine 
                                                
29 Miller, Consuming Religion, p. 7. 
30 Miller, Consuming Religion, p. 7. 
31 Karsten Harries, Meaning of Modern Art (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), p. 80. 
32 David Morgan, The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 48, 65.  
33  David Morgan, Visual Piety: A History and Theory of Popular Religious Images 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 23.  
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but also those within the family through meaningful object selection.34 
Similarly, functions may be as simple as a reminder of faith commitment, 
as in a Muslim shahada pendant ; or as an indirect or non-confrontational 
method for ‘witnessing’, as in Christian T-shirts or “witness wear”.35 Some 
religious kitsch, especially images of Christ, Mary or other Christian saints 
that emphasise their traits of tenderness, sympathy and accessibility, are 
kept to ‘watch over’ believers because “divine sovereignty is less important 
than divine mercy”.36  
Even this domesticated version of religious experience is often of 
questionable authenticity to critics of kitsch. Frank Burch Brown suggests 
that any art that aspires to sublimity is doomed because having “overtly 
grand and lofty goals, the art of the sublime, when anything less than truly 
great, tends to cheapen its subject to some degree, which often results in at 
least traces of kitsch”.37 As discussed above, the issue of ‘bad taste’ is 
revealed to be in practice a concern over the ability to accurately, or at least 
adequately, represent the glory of the sacred. Roger Scruton takes it a step 
further and argues that religious kitsch, in attempting to elicit devotion and 
emotion, takes us on a shortcut that removes all authenticity from the 
experience because “religious peace is a rare gift, which comes about only 
through spiritual discipline… [kitsch] takes us there too easily, so that we 
know we have not arrived”.38 In other words the devotion educed from 
religious kitsch is obtained without the effort that genuine spirituality 
requires, so it cannot be real. Scruton also participates in the above-
mentioned implication of the kitsch devotee in the critique of the kitsch 
object. He claims that kitsch-inspired emotion is not possible without the 
participation of the viewer; the kitsch-man is complicit in the pretense: 
“kitsch art is pretending to express something, and you, in accepting it, are 
pretending to feel.”39  
In addition, it is thought to actively exploit these feelings to distract 
the viewer from more important issues. This is part of the reason why 
                                                
34 McDannell, Material Christianity, pp. 34-35.  
35 Heather Hendershot, Shaking the World For Jesus: Media and Conservative Evangelical 
Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 9, 19. 
36 Morgan, Visual Piety, p. 24. 
37 Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious 
Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. xi.  
38 Scruton, ‘Kitsch and the Modern Predicament’.  
39 Scruton, ‘Kitsch and the Modern Predicament’. Italics in original.  
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religious kitsch deals only in the gentle, positive sentiments rather than the 
controversial, confrontational points of ‘serious’ discourse; even though, 
says Theodor Adorno, the people need relief from boredom they need relief 
from effort simultaneously. 40  For example, consider the popularity of 
objects that propagate the idea that “Jesus Loves You”. This is a frequent 
theme of Christian kitsch, and compared to other popular religious media 
that espouses negative messages such as homophobia, anti-feminism or fear 
of hellfire, it does not challenge the viewer politically and only lightly 
tickles the believers’ theological position. 41  It may even create the 
impression that such controversies do not actually exist. Morgan writes that 
with regard for popular piety, “for most people, it is more important to cope 
with an oppressive or indifferent world than to resist it”.42  
While it would seem that religious kitsch operates on this 
immediately superficial and duplicitous level, the finer mechanics of such 
emotional invocation would suggest that the emotions are in fact based 
upon a legitimate religious experience. If we follow the logic of Scruton 
and many others, it is hard to explain the strength of response from kitsch 
enthusiasts, since kitsch itself is so empty of content, unless they were 
actually responding to something in their own experience that is triggered 
by contemplation of the kitsch object. Robert C. Solomon points out that to 
assume that the object of emotion is the cause mistakes the genuine 
emotions beyond the image; he gives the example of a saccharine velvet 
painting of Jesus that is presumed itself to be the object of affection when 
in actuality the object of affection is God.43 In this way religious kitsch can 
be a channel to authentic experience, or at least the memory or nostalgia of 
such experience. While it is commendable that Scruton attributes such 
                                                
40 Theodor Adorno, quoted in Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, p. 242.  
41  Evangelical Christian media, especially in the United States, commonly tackles 
controversial issues head on. For example the issue of abortion is openly confronted with 
Christian t-shirts promoting controversial political agendas with slogans such as ‘abortion 
stops a beating heart’ accompanied by a picture of a foetus 
(http://www.prolifeworld.com/abortion-stops-a-beating-heart-t-shirt-tattoo-design. Accessed 
1/03/2015), or addressed in films such as October Baby, about an ‘abortion survivor’, a 
politically charged way of referring to someone who has survived an attempted abortion 
through ‘God’s grace’, medicine or adoption (Andrew Erwin and John Erwin, Gravitas and 
Provident Films, 2011).  
42 Morgan, Visual Piety, p. 23. 
43 Solomon, ‘On Kitsch and Sentimentality’, p. 11.  
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active agency to consumers of religious kitsch as to be complicit in their 
own deception because it acknowledges that consumers are not passive in 
their engagement, lovers of kitsch would hardly be concerned if such 
engagement returns a positive experience into religious life. The pretense is 
indeed mutual, but it is entered into willingly and deliberately. 
It may be considered that such deliberate self-provocation is 
perverse.44 Yet much of this kind of criticism comes from the perspective 
that the manipulative nature of kitsch somehow violates the autonomy of 
the rational individual. Deborah Knight comments that these critiques turn 
on the rhetoric of seduction or assault, provoking emotion that originates 
elsewhere and the intensity of which cannot be controlled, and she reminds 
us of Solomon’s point that there appears to be no violation when the person 
is reasoned with.45 Yet I have argued that religious kitsch is used willingly, 
despite its deceptive temperament, and so perhaps the better approach is to 
neither accuse nor excuse kitsch as if it were an animal with carnivorous 
intentions on our culture and instead accept simply that it operates as a 
material expression of religious feelings, and not concern ourselves with 
whether or not the sentiments are genuine or abusive. 
Here I turn to the work of Celeste Olalquiaga, who describes the 
above tactics that kitsch employs in a more neutral manner, terming the 
relationship of consumer with object as “vicariousness” rather than 
exploitation or parasitism. For Olalquiaga, this vicariousness stems from 
the postmodern condition in which “experience is mainly available through 
signs: things are not lived directly but rather through the agency of a 
medium, in the consumption of images and objects that replace what they 
stand for”.46 Kitsch, then, is subject to forces that are affecting culture in 
general and as such it cannot be singled out among the many examples of 
cultural volatility and transferability. For Olalquiaga, vicariousness 
                                                
44  Deborah Knight, ‘Why We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality: A Meta-Aesthetic 
Perspective’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 57, no. 4 (1999), p. 414. 
45 Knight, ‘Why We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality’, p.416. It is interesting to note the 
gendered nature of the association between the emotions causing violation and reason 
withstanding such violation, especially if it is considered that kitsch is traditionally 
feminised in connection with the very sentimentality which turns out to be the weapon of 
attack. See McDannell, Material Christianity, pp. 163-197, for a discussion on the 
feminisation of religious kitsch.   
46  Celeste Olalquiaga, Megalopolis: Contemporary Cultural Sensibilities (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 40.  
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attempts to compensate for the “waning of affect” or emotional detachment 
experienced in postmodernity, and kitsch is most suitable for these ends 
because it answers the search for intense thrills and acute emotionality 
attributed to other times and places.47 In other words, kitsch lovers, or 
“aficionados”, cannot be blamed for their fascination; they are simply 
coping with the increasing abstraction of daily life and are finding new 
opportunities for creating their own articulation of that life. One problem 
with this postmodern emphasis is that kitsch existed before the postmodern 
era, and in fact for some theorists, it is inextricably bound to the advent of 
modernity and modernism.48 It is interesting though, that modernism fed 
many of the celebrated critics of kitsch, such as Greenberg and Dorfles, 
whilst more sympathetic perspectives such as those of Olalquiaga and 
Solomon all fall firmly within the postmodern era allowing for plurality 
and cultural relativism.  
By this stage I must pause and make explicit any defining 
characteristics of kitsch that have emerged throughout the preceding 
discussion. I have by no means compiled a comprehensive list; rather it is 
more of a sketch that can be used to measure an item of potential kitsch 
against so that I am better able to base my use of the term on characteristics 
of the item rather than Scruton’s “yuk” feeling. Even though some of the 
characteristics may appear as negative or unethical, such as the ethical 
hotspot of commodification, I wish to stress that pointing out such aspects 
is not the same as using them to discredit an object simply because one 
disagrees with the cultural characteristic it is embodying. That would be a 
subjective assessment, and though it may be valid (there are indeed ethical 
questions raised by commodification), in the end it is less relevant for my 
purposes because kitsch is commodified whether one likes it or not. The 
above discussion may be distilled into roughly six points of definition, 
following the order of the argument so far: 1) Religious kitsch entails an 
ambiguous or blurred separation of the sacred and profane 2) Religious 
kitsch is commodified 3) Religious kitsch is used in everyday domestic 
practice rather than official or exclusively religious contexts – this is a 
culmination of points one and two 4) Religious kitsch uses imitation and 
repetition to visually situate itself within an established religious tradition 
                                                
47 Olalquiaga, Megalopolis, p. 40. 
48 For example, kitsch is one of Calinescu’s “Five Faces of Modernity”. See Calinescu, Five 
Faces of Modernity, p. 225. 
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and to replicate the emotional experience of that tradition 5) religious kitsch 
acts as a shortcut to that emotion which can be immediately accessed 
through the object without difficulty or effort 6) consumers of religious 
kitsch are both actively and passively involved in creating its meaning; 
there may be a degree of fantasy into which consumers are seduced, but 
they are also able to participate in the construction of that fantasy. Thus 
theoretically I have an idea of how kitsch operates, but I am yet to consider 
what it actually looks like. For this each point will be briefly considered 
through concrete examples, for even though I argued that there are general 
characteristics of kitsch, they do not always manifest in exactly the same 
ways. 
 
Kitsch in Religious Practice: Christianity and Islam  
Studies of Christian kitsch are by far the most accessible, particularly as 
many of the criticisms dealt with in this article emerge from theological and 
artistic traditions that embrace religious imagery as a crucial part of the 
canon of Western art. Similarly, scholars of material cultural studies, when 
focusing on religion, have tended to consider Christian examples. While 
not quite a wealth of literature, scholarship on Christian commodities is 
widely available; although, due to historical and cultural reasons with 
which have become familiar from the argument above, these studies rarely 
use the term “kitsch”. Instead the everyday objects with Christian content 
or use are referred to in ways such as “material culture”, “visual piety” or 
“Christian cultural products”.49  
Studying Islamic kitsch is difficult for different reasons. There is 
very little on Islamic material culture that has not been absorbed into 
studies of Islamic art which in turn are absorbed into general Islamic 
studies with a rather historicist methodology exclusive of alternative 
approaches, so making a focus on aesthetic elements seemingly secondary 
or superfluous.50 There is also a tendency to consider all Islamic culture as 
equivalent to Middle Eastern culture. It is important to note that this is not 
                                                
49 See McDannell, Material Christianity, Morgan, Visual Piety, Hendershot, Shaking the 
World for Jesus, respectively. One notable exception is Olalquiaga, Megalopolis, in which 
she freely uses the term ‘kitsch’ to describe religious artefacts, and to her credit is able to do 
so without conveying historical or cultural prejudice. See her chapter there, ‘Holy Kitschen: 
Collecting Religious Junk from the Street’, pp. 36-55.  
50 Oliver Leaman, Islamic Aesthetics: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004), p. vii. 
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always the case, and Islamic culture varies across times and places and can 
be distinct from nationally or culturally specific ideas. However, Islamic 
culture is, like all cultures in a postmodern globalised world, subject to the 
forces of commodification, and the assumption that commodification is 
somehow antithetical to Islam is unsound.51 There are what Jeanette Jouili 
calls the ‘halal arts’, where pious Muslims express their religion and other 
aspects of their lives through art and material culture.52 Hence, Islam is 
prone to forces of ‘kitschification’ in the same ways other religions are, 
where the kitsch process involves a homogenisation of aesthetic and 
cultural elements, and so it is in fact reflective of the kitsch perspective that 
diversity should be simplified and flattened. So while there are cultural and 
aesthetic differences in Islamic art from different regions, when one walks 
into an Islamic bookshop, for example, an azan (call to prayer) clock from 
Turkey may be indistinguishable from an azan clock from Pakistan.  
In addition, there is the widespread assumption that Islam prohibits 
figural representation. This is problematic because it is not necessarily true; 
Islam’s relationship with imagery is exceedingly complex and there are no 
hard and fast rules pertaining to the representation of figures. Even images 
of the prophet Muhammad exist through the history of Islamic art, 
something that is considered to be explicitly forbidden.53 There is in fact no 
specific proscription in the Quran concerning figural representation but 
extreme caution is advised in the hadith.54 The nature of this concern is 
ambiguous, and in keeping with the task at hand of avoiding judgements as 
to whether such images are right or wrong, the focus here will remain on 
the way that such images exemplify kitsch rather than their ethical standing 
within the tradition. Clement Greenberg’s maxim to avoid the figural image 
                                                
51 Yael Navaro-Yashin, ‘The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism and Commodities’, 
in Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: I. 
B. Tauris, 2001), p. 222. 
52 Jeanette Jouili, ‘Halal Arts: What’s in a Concept?’, Material Religion, vol. 8, no. 3 (2012), 
pp. 342-343.  
53 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Drawing the Prophet: Islam’s Hidden History of Muhammad 
Images’, The Guardian, (11/01/2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/drawing-prophet-islam-muhammad-images. 
Accessed 27/02/2015. Graham-Harrison refers to both historical and modern examples of art 
that depicts Muhammad, such as a 15th Century illuminated manuscript from Afghanistan 
and a public mural in Tehran painted in 2008.  
54 Patricia L. Baker, Islam and the Religious Arts (New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 37.; 
Sahih Muslim, vol. 3, no. 5271. 
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or you will land yourself in kitsch holds strange parallels to Islam in that 
we may say avoid the figural image or you will land yourself in shirk 
(idolatry).55 Yet as we have seen, figural images, while extremely common, 
are not necessary to make an object kitsch. Thus Islamic kitsch manifests 
quite differently to Christian kitsch which often revolves around portrayals 
of Jesus, Mary or other saints, and even at times figural representations of 
God himself, but it still functions fully as religious objects. Islamic kitsch, 
as available through the same channels as other forms of religious kitsch 
such as bookstores, online religious retailers, markets and so on, has an 
identifiable aesthetic that relies more on calligraphic decoration and other 
non-figurative embellishment such as (fake) gold and silver. One may 
purchase Islamic jewellery, wall decorations, door bells that greet visitors 
Islamically with “assalamualaikum peace be upon you”, or trinkets to hang 
from the car rearview mirror.56 However, it is unlikely that you would find 
humanistic figurines such as those found in Christian kitsch.57 
My focus now shifts to two particular examples that hopefully can 
illustrate the points of my discussion. The first is the Christian example, I 
will refer to it as a “Jesus light switch” (Figure 2), a cover that can be fixed 
onto any domestic light switch, portraying Jesus with his arms around two 
small children, molded in cream plastic. This example has been selected in 
part to balance out the excessive criticism of this light switch that has 
proliferated across the internet, in which the image is taken humourously as 
a picture of paedophilic intent. Information about this object is scarce, but I 
will make two assumptions about it; firstly that it was made with serious 
intent, and secondly that it belongs to the middle decades of the twentieth 
century. The second example continues on the household lighting theme: an 
electric lamp (Figure 3), purchased by the author from a local Islamic 
                                                
55 Greenberg, quoted in Scruton, ‘Kitsch and the Modern Predicament’, para. 3. 
56 For just one example see the azan clocks for sale at Darussalam Online Islamic Bookstore, 
http://dsbooks.com.au/islamic-essentials/azan-clocks.html. Accessed 1/03/2015. 
57 One notable exception is the Islamic Barbie doll. There are several versions, with the most 
well-known being the Fulla doll. I have strong reservations about calling a Muslim Barbie 
kitsch, as she is a highly politicised and meaningful product that engages multiple discourses 
and has a deliberate agenda. See for example the kinds of academic treatment she has 
received: Faegheh Shirazi, ‘Islam and Barbie: The Commodification of Hijabi Dolls’, 
Islamic Perspective, vol.3 (2010), pp. 10-27 and Amina Yaqin, ‘Islamic Barbie: The Politics 
of Gender and Performativity’, Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body & Culture, vol. 
11, no. 2-3 (2007), pp. 173-188. 
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bookstore, that contains within it a montage of Islamic images, namely the 
Ka’aba and pilgrims at Mecca, the Quran, and stylized calligraphy 
announcing the ninety-nine names of Allah. The image is lit up and rotates 
inside the lamp when in operation. Information about this object is also 
scarce, but again, in keeping with the flattening and abstracting of 
commodification, this does not pose too great a problem for the meaning of 
a kitsch object should be apparent from its superficial qualities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Jesus Light Switch. Image retrieved 19/2/2015 from 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/68328119316651489. 
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Figure 3: Islamic Kitsch (Ka’aba lamp back right), photograph by Elisha 
McIntyre 2015. 
 
Sacred/Profane, Commodification and the Everyday 
Both Christianity and Islam have elements within their traditions that 
consider the visual representation of the divine as theologically suspect. 
The reasoning behind this is complex. Images may improperly stimulate 
the senses and distract the believer from the essence of the word of God. As 
God is the sole source of creation and beauty, images may instill in their 
creator a false sense of pride or in the viewer an inappropriate admiration 
for human creativity.58 In particular there is the difficulty of representing in 
visual form God himself when he is considered to be formless or at least 
too glorious to be appropriately depicted by the humble human 
imagination. In Christianity, the fact that God himself became human in 
form could present a justification for the ability to accurately represent him. 
Yet Muhammad was in human form also, and even though he was not 
                                                
58 Asli Gocer, ‘A Hypothesis Concerning the Character of Islamic Art’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 60, no. 4 (1999), pp. 690-91.  
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divine, his image has been repressed more so than that of Jesus. However, 
the main concern of religious kitsch is not accuracy but affectivity. This 
means that regardless of the content religious kitsch seeks religious 
devotion, and the everyday form of the object dictates that the sacred will 
inevitably come into contact with the profane, despite what is said in 
abstract theological debates.  
The Jesus light switch dissolves the point at which Jesus is too holy 
to be contacted through an everyday object. The immanence of God and his 
involvement in the direction of everyday affairs means that there is little 
separation between the sacred and profane, one can exist within and direct 
the other. Thus Jesus is theologically the light of the world59 and so should 
be practically accessible as the light of the room. Surely this word play was 
not missed by the switch’s creators, and it displays a self-awareness that 
kitsch often exhibits. But while this intentionality causes us to laugh, it is 
also designed in all seriousness to remind believers of their faith 
commitment and obedience, as the fine print across the light reads “honour 
thy mother and thy father”. It truly reminds believers that Jesus is biblically 
the light, even if they cringe at the obviousness of the reference. This is a 
religious act, similar to a religious pendant worn around the neck, when by 
virtue of its everydayness the religiosity of the object is so deeply 
embedded that one forgets it is there, until an everyday act such as turning 
on the light forces recognition and subsequent remembrance of both the 
literal light switch and what the light switch represents.  
What allows this access to daily experience of religion in the 
domestic space is the commodification of religion, the process that creates 
an environment in which it is acceptable (and profitable) for religious 
individuals to buy objects into which they may invest their religious 
activity. Gregory Starrett argues in his study of Islamic commodities in 
Egypt that religious commodities are only religious once they cease to 
become commodities, that is they are b(r)ought over the threshold into to 
the private/domestic sphere.60 He argues that the objects are able to exist as 
exchangeable objects, equal to “chocolates and flowers” because the 
objects themselves are only activated once they are bought by a Muslim 
and thus not contaminated whilst in the state of hopefully temporary 
                                                
59 John 8:12. 
60 Gregory Starrett, ‘The Political Economy of Religious Commodities in Cairo’, American 
Anthropologist, vol. 97, no. 1(1995), p. 59. 
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commodification. 61  The commodification of such objects does not 
automatically mean profanation because the objects themselves are treated 
with the utmost respect. The Ka’aba lamp, because it contains the holy 
names of Allah should be given pride of place and be displayed above all 
other objects. It should also never come into contact with impurity, for 
example, it should theoretically not be used in a bathroom.62  Just to 
complicate things, I may ask whether the Ka’ba lamp sitting upon my non-
Muslim desk was in actuality more religious and less of a commodity when 
it was on the shelf in an Islamic bookstore in Sydney, presumably intended 
for purchase by a Muslim who would “activate” the religious power of the 
lamp, whilst in reality it has been totally removed from that religiosity by 
its position on my desk and even its incorporation into this study. This 
question is further confirmation that the separation of sacred and profane is 
ambiguous in these objects and it is their function in the everyday that 
dictates their religiosity.  
 
Imitation and Emotion 
The figure on the light switch is immediately recognisable as Jesus, not 
because there is any explicit label announcing his identity, but because 
there exists an equally, if not more powerfully, legible language of signs 
and symbols. One becomes fluent in this language by exposure to repetition 
of similar imagery, and in living in a Christianised Western world the 
prolific image already discussed above of Jesus as a Caucasian man with 
flowing locks and beard, his large blue eyes expressing friendliness, 
benevolence and above all tenderness, cannot be escaped. Despite the 
absence of colour in the Jesus light switch (generally unusual for kitsch), 
the image can still be connected with the tradition of images that have gone 
before it. Certain symbols such as the sacred heart around his neck identify 
the object further as Catholic, although it must be pointed out that the heart 
appears to be a necklace rather than the burning heart of Christ himself that 
is typical of Catholic imagery. This actually makes the object more kitsch 
because of its lack of concern over the detail; all that is sought here is the 
immediate identification as a sacred heart, something that is achieved 
purely by imitation of other established religious devotional imagery. 
Similarly the Ka’aba lamp draws upon the extensive history of Islamic 
                                                
61 Starrett, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 54.  
62 Starrett, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 56.  
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calligraphy, and in particular exploits its position as the bearer of divine 
revelation and thus its extreme holiness.63 By including the word of Allah, 
the Ka’aba lamp is taken beyond its apparent function of household 
furnishing. This is achieved through replication of the religious devotion 
that is ordinarily reserved for Quranic text.  
It has been argued that it is the replication of the emotion attached 
to these established traditions that is the main if not defining feature of 
religious kitsch, and it is at this point that I wish to venture that Christian 
and Islamic kitsch diverge. Both incorporate the techniques that incite 
immediate and effortless religious devotion, but the nature of the emotion 
elicited differs in kind. While of course there are indeed exceptions to this 
generalisation, for the most part Islamic kitsch aspires to invoke the glory 
of Allah while Christian kitsch tends to emphasise the love of God. In both 
traditions these two elements of the divine are present (consider that Allah 
is known as the most Merciful and the most Loving as well as the Glorious 
and the Sovereign, while Christ is the Way, the Truth and the Light as well 
as the Lamb) but the story told by religious kitsch gives a particular picture. 
Christian kitsch is predominantly what Solomon calls “sweet” kitsch, that 
is, “art that appeals unsubtly and unapologetically to the softer, ‘sweeter’ 
sentiments”.64 This is why much of general kitsch theory can be applied to 
Christian kitsch because we see in it familiar tactics such as figural 
depictions of children with large teardrop eyes painted or sculpted in pastel, 
holding puppies or alternatively their hands folded in prayer. According to 
Brown these kinds of “lite” worship can allow for softer and less critical 
feelings to emerge that may otherwise be squeezed out by more demanding 
forms of worship.65  
On the Jesus light switch these softer feelings manifest in the 
tenderness of Jesus’ arms guiding and protecting the children who are 
depicted as little and ‘cute’, dressed in Sunday best and displaying all the 
attributes of the well behaved children desired by the caption across the top 
of the switch that reads “Honour thy Father and Mother”. The image guides 
the believer to a sweet understanding of Jesus without much effort or 
                                                
63 Lois Lamya Al-Faruqi, Islam and Art (Islamabad: National Hijra Council, 1985), p. 33.  
64 Solomon, ‘On Kitsch and Sentimentality’, p. 1.  
65 Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste, p. 20. See also his insightful analysis 
of this kind of “sweet” Christian kitsch in his discussion on the Precious Moments Chapel, 
pp. 128-159.  
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investment. This is of interest in relation to the internet hype surrounding 
the image; a reaction that I would argue actually highlights the light 
switch’s kitschness. An online search for Jesus light switch returns 
innumerable results focusing on the apparent hilarity of the alternative 
reading of this image which sees Jesus as exposing himself to these 
children.66 Yet because kitsch is always intended in seriousness it is never 
ironic, thus finding such humour in the object actually reinforces its 
kitschness through showing up its earnestness. The sentimentality of the 
kitsch object obscures the ease with which this emotion is reached and also 
distracts from serious issues, what Johan Cilliers calls an “‘aesthetical’ 
ideal to cleanse and sanitise life from all that smacks of suffering”.67 Thus 
the tender and loving Christ is here taken in all seriousness to have a 
completely appropriate relationship with the children for two reasons; 
firstly, the tradition of images and ideologies that the light switch is 
referencing tells the viewer that Jesus had such a relationship with children, 
and secondly, in true kitsch style the viewer is seeking only the immediate 
and apparent meaning. In addition there are factors of faith and blasphemy 
and intention and context, which would prevent a devout Christian from 
reading the image in the way that is so apparent to non-Christian viewers. 
This is beyond the scope of this article, but it brings me to the point that the 
positive feelings evoked by the light switch are able to sublimate any 
alternative readings of the image. Most obviously, the issue of paedophilia 
is the alternative, serious reading of this image. The original shallowness of 
the image interestingly works to make available only one meaning, the one 
created by the tools of imitation and uncritical emotion. Deeper thinking is 
discouraged, and the true kitsch-man who would appreciate this light 
switch for what was its presumably original intention would simply fail to 
notice its alternative readings, although care must be taken here regarding 
the old elitist habit that assumes the reason for this obtuseness would be 
lack of sophistication or education. 
                                                
66 Comments on this image posted on various websites commonly make explicit sexual 
references, for example, “Jesus is showing his boner to two children” (Slut Machine, ‘Jesus 
Christ’, at http://jezebel.com/349758/jesus-christ, 28/1/2008. Accessed 19/2/2015), or even 
sexual puns such as “now that’s a res-erection!” (Jimbo Horsefly, at ‘Jesus Light Switch’, 
Bore Me, at http://www.boreme.com/posting.php?id=15394. Accessed 19/2/15).  
67 Johan Cilliers, ‘The Unveiling of Life’, p. 2.  
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It is possible that the avoidance of figural representation in Islamic 
kitsch contributes to the paucity of “sweet” kitsch in Islam because the 
sentiments cannot rely on emotive cues based on tender facial expressions 
or loving body language and so on. Instead the imagery tends to be more 
abstract and as such is devoid of much of the tenderness elicited by kitsch’s 
communion with all humanity. Humanity is not the subject of Islamic 
kitsch, and whereas Christian kitsch will reach its arms out to the believer 
in a loving embrace, Islamic kitsch tends to act as a signifier of Allah’s 
transcendence despite its form in everyday objects. This is reinforced by 
the importance of position and treatment of the object as well as its visual 
content. The Ka’aba lamp montage depicts objects alone, even the images 
of pilgrims are reduced and unclear, turned into a motif instead of an appeal 
to pilgrim communitas. The mosques, the Ka’aba and the Quran, along 
with the calligraphic script, float across the surface of the lamp and when it 
is in operation the rotation of the images creates a transcendent 
timelessness. Often images of the Quran show light streaming out of the 
pages of the book, and this effect is replicated when the light of the lamp 
flows out from the behind the image. The viewer is brought out of the 
hypnotic effect only by the whir of the internal motor that reminds one that 
the light is generated by a bulb instead of the luminance of Allah, although 
this is the effect that makes the object kitsch.  
 
Agency 
The final point of definition regards the participation of believers in the 
creation of kitsch. An object enters the state of kitsch only if its 
engagement with the viewer conforms to the characteristics noted above 
since kitsch cannot be intentionally produced.68 This involves the believer 
taking the object not as kitsch but as a serious object that may legitimately 
be incorporated into their personal religious practice. This may indeed 
involve some deception. However, it also may imbue the believer with the 
powers of kitsch object itself; that is the ability to selectively sublimate 
undesired aspects of the object and take from it those that are of benefit. 
The selection not only of objects but specific aspects of chosen objects is 
part of the postmodern believer’s personal pastiche in which the use of 
kitsch becomes unique and unrepeatable.69 In this respect kitsch is actively 
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used in identity formation. For Christians the display of the Jesus light 
switch in the home re-embeds the presence God in daily life.70 For Muslims 
the display of a Ka’aba lamp may connect them to the greater Islamic 
ummah and help defragment an identity that may have been disrupted by 
immigration or media misrepresentation.71  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the difficulties in adopting the term “kitsch”, its use need not be 
avoided when applied with an awareness of its actual meanings as they 
stand undistorted by the prism of Western cultural elitism. Upon deeper 
examination kitsch and religious kitsch are indeed discrete categories that 
exhibit characteristics identifiable through the object’s structural, cultural 
and religious qualities. These qualities reflect an ambiguous separation of 
sacred and profane, commodification, use in everyday religious practice, 
imitation of aesthetics and emotion and personal agency of the believer. 
The worth of religious kitsch is directly related to its success not only as an 
image but as a religious image, and its popularity demonstrates that for 
many believers these objects fully function religiously and aesthetically. 
This is by no means a comprehensive study, and I would like to conclude it 
with some recommendations for further study. 
Firstly, there is a need for studies that do not shy away from using 
the term “kitsch” as I have described it here, where the word is not used as 
a synonym for bad taste or poor quality but rather as a term to cover objects 
that are actively used by believers to bring the sacred into their everyday, 
material lives. In addition, kitsch should be understood as distinct from 
“material culture” or “religious cultural products”, since there are aesthetic 
and ethical implications that apply to kitsch that do not necessarily apply to 
these other categories. Secondly, I ask whether completely commercialised 
religious objects (for example Christian t-shirts that play on pop culture) 
could still be considered kitsch because they have a consciousness about 
them that defies our understanding of kitsch’s earnestness and rejection of 
irony. Lastly, the area of Islamic kitsch is drastically understudied in 
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71 Joann D’Alisera, ‘I ♥ Islam: Popular Religious Commodities, Sites of Inscription, and 
Transnational Sierra Leonean Identity’, Journal of Material Culture, vol. 6, no.1 (2001), p. 
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relation to the quantity of it that exists and the reasons for this inattention 
should form part of these studies. 
 
 
